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ABSTRACT 
The blue economy is a globally emerging concept for oceans governance that seeks to tap the 
economic potential of the oceans in environmentally sustainable ways. Yet understanding and 
implementation of particular visions of the blue economy in specific regions diverge 
according to national and other contexts. Drawing on a discourse analysis of Chinese 
language documents, this article assesses how the blue economy has been conceptualised in 
Chinese state policy and discourse. Part of a state ideology and practice of modernisation that 
is defined in terms of rejuvenation under a strong state, the blue economy in China is seen as 
an opportunity to promote modernisation from overlapping economic, geopolitical and 
ecological perspectives and actions. China’s distinctive model for the blue economy presents 
emerging challenges for global ocean governance.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Globally, academic and policy discussions surrounding the emergent ‘blue economy’ have 
rapidly proliferated in recent years (Silver et al., 2015; Voyer et al. 2018; Bennett et al. 2019; 




reconfigure the institutions that govern access and use of marine resources and coastal spaces 
(Brent et al., 2020). At the broadest level, the blue economy is envisaged as a governance 
regime that links economic growth and environmental sustainability. This vision has been 
promoted by major global institutions including the World Bank (2017) and the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (2018). At the same time, the concept is 
increasingly critiqued for its emphasis on an economic approach that potentially marginalises 
weaker stakeholders, such as small-scale fishers (Bennett et al., 2019; Brent et al., 2020). 
However, there remains much variation over how the blue economy is interpreted, 
represented and implemented in different regions and geographical contexts (Voyer et al., 
2018). Based on a critical discourse analysis, this paper describes and analyses how the idea 
of the blue economy is being conceptualised and implemented in China.  
We argue that understanding the emergence of the blue economy in China matters for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the sheer scale and significance of China in economic, demographic 
and geopolitical terms means decisions taken in China about ocean governance have global 
impacts. As China continues to take an increasingly active presence in the world’s oceans 
through resource extraction, aid, trade and intergovernmental fora, Chinese ideas about the 
blue economy will have increasing political weight in the future (Crona et al. 2020). 
Secondly, the emergence of the blue economy in China is significant because the ways in 
which the Chinese state conceives of economic use and governance of the oceans are quite 
different from the blue economy ideas of states such as the United States. In contrast to 
prevalent conceptions of the blue economy that link environmental sustainability with 
economic development (see Cisneros-Montemayor, 2019 for a recent review), China’s 
conceptions of the blue economy revolve around how it can contribute to a state-centric 
vision of modernisation, which includes—but subordinates—environmental sustainability 




minimise conflict, ocean policymakers need to better understand the bases on which China’s 
blue economy is emerging, and its likely trajectories.  
Because of the high degree of state control in China (Zhao, 2016), understanding the role of 
the state and its relationship to the blue economy in China is necessary. Scholars now 
describe China’s economy as a version of state capitalism, where the state takes a ‘leading 
role in fostering and guiding capital accumulation’ (McNally, 2012: 744; see also Naughton 
and Tsai, 2015; Zheng and Huang, 2018). In China, state capitalism is characterised by the 
strong role of the state in guiding economic policy; by the strong role of state-owned 
enterprises; and is closely linked to economic nationalism, where economic power is closely 
tied to national power (McNally, 2012; Belesky and Lawrence, 2019). Although there is 
much literature written in China—in Chinese language for a largely Chinese audience—
English language studies on Chinese ocean governance remain relatively small in number 
(e.g. Mallory, 2013, 2016; Lu et al., 2015; Feng et al., 2016; Choi, 2017; Zhang and Wu, 
2017). In this article, we describe blue economy discourses and practices as they emerge in 
China and how they relate to the broader context of Chinese state capitalism.  
The current Chinese state vision of the blue economy was encapsulated by Premier Li 
Keqiang in his policy brief in early 2019: “Vigorously develop the blue economy, protect the 
ocean environment, and construct a maritime power” (⼤⼒发展蓝⾊经济，保护海洋环
境，建设海洋强国) (Li, 2019). These three goals are closely linked with wider goals of the 
Chinese state to attain ‘socialist modernisation’ (Xi, 2014). In this paper, we examine how in 
Chinese literature the blue economy simultaneously acts as a modernising opportunity from 
economic, geopolitical and environmental perspectives. These perspectives overlap and 




associated with the goals of the Chinese state, with the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
firmly in control at the helm.  
UNDERSTANDING THE BLUE ECONOMY IN CHINA 
Coined in the 1990s in a Western context, the term ‘blue economy’ gained global widespread 
popularity by the 2010s, though no consensus about the term exists (Silver et al., 2015; Voyer 
et al., 2018). The term ‘blue economy’ is less of a clear program for policy action than a 
contemporary ‘buzzword’ incorporating a range of contested meanings and definitions 
(Bueger, 2015). Most dominant definitions coming from the English language and from 
multilateral institutions tend to emphasise the broad linkages between economic development 
and ecological sustainability, using tools such as economic accounting and marine spatial 
planning (Cisneros-Montemayor, 2019). Building on Silver et al. (2015), Voyer et al. (2018) 
categorised four central interpretations of the blue economy concept: oceans as natural 
capital, oceans as livelihoods, oceans as a driver of innovation, and oceans as good business.  
Yet there has been limited discussion of how the blue economy is unfolding in varied 
geographic contexts (see Choi 2017). How the blue economy is represented and implemented 
in different nation-states relates closely to national development priorities, and how the 
largely global discourse of the blue economy articulates with regional, national and local 
interests remains an area for much further research (Childs and Hicks, 2019). The focus in 
this paper is on Chinese-state envisioning of the blue economy as a process of modernisation.  
Modernisation is an inherently ambiguous term with multiple perspectives that has been 
heavily theorised in the social sciences, including in the Chinese context (e.g. Beck et al., 
1994; Kipnis, 2012). Our focus here is on how the idea of modernisation has been conceived 
by the Chinese state, where it has played a significant role over many years. For example, the 




technology—provided one of the key policy platforms for Deng Xiaoping in the post-1978 
reform period. Deng’s stated goal for these modernisations was to achieve a ‘moderately 
prosperous society’ (小康社会) through economic growth. While particular strategies and 
policies have changed, the idea of modernisation continues to inform much of state 
governance in China.  
One recent definition of modernisation in China is by the influential nationalist Chinese 
academic Hu Angang, who defines it as ‘the process of a series of modern elements and 
combination modes in society, displaying ground-breaking change or reform from a low to a 
high level’ (Hu, 2013; cited in Hu et al., 2017: 271). Importantly, this theory is ‘not based on 
Western ideas’ (Hu et al., 2017: 271), corresponding with much other discourse in China that 
stresses Chinese exceptionalism, which has arisen more prominently in President Xi Jinping’s 
era (Callahan, 2012). Xi regularly refers to modernisation in the context of the improvement 
of Chinese society, which includes but is not limited to material improvement (see also Bai 
and Liu 2020); for example, attaining ‘modernisation of the state governance system and 
capacity’ through ‘follow[ing] the socialist system with Chinese characteristics’ (Xi, 2014a). 
‘Socialist modernisation’ is the goal of the Chinese state, which is to be attained ‘by the 
middle of the 21st century’ (Xi, 2014b).  
In this paper we interpret Chinese state efforts at modernisation within the context of 
overarching state models of economic and political development (Zhao 2010). Following 
Zheng and Huang, we understand Chinese state efforts at modernisation as part of a model of 
economic and political development where ‘the fundamental logic of the market is made 
structurally subordinate to the political imperatives of the state…. [T]he state and the 
economy are regarded as inseparable, and the state is an important—even the most 




Under Xi Jinping, this model has shifted to a more assertive stance globally, where China 
now seeks to actively challenge and shape global governance (Zhao 2017, Morton 2020). A 
unifying theme is that of the ‘Chinese Dream’ (中国梦), a signature slogan promoted by Xi 
and associated with the idea of national rejuvenation, or re-capturing the nation’s past 
glories—in contrast to historical periods where China has been ‘humiliated’ by foreign 
powers (Callahan, 2017). Thus, Chinese modernisation is a state ideology and practice that is 
defined in terms of national rejuvenation under a strong state and led by a strong CPC. This 
large-scale backdrop of rejuvenation and Chinese exceptionalism is the broader context in 




We draw on a critical discourse analysis of documents (n=284) conducted by the first and 
second authors, including peer-reviewed papers and books, academic theses, policy papers or 
government reports and pronouncements, and news media and published research articles, 
almost all in Chinese. Other authors provided input based on their own relevant expertise on 
the blue economy (e.g. Satizábal et al., 2020); and specifically, China’s conceptualisations of 
the blue economy, including insights gained via field research conducted in China and with 
knowledge of Chinese language (e.g. Mallory 2013).  
We define discourses as “(dominant) ideas, concepts and categorisations in a society that 
give meaning to reality and that shape the identities, interests, and preferences of individuals 
and groups” (Arts et al. 2010, 57). Discourses are the parts of social interaction in which 
meaning is negotiated, and particular ideas and social practices become normalised, as part of 




Studying discourse can be particularly effective in illuminating the indirect and non-coercive 
aspects of state power that subtly influence how subjects behave and how interventions 
unfold (Agrawal, 2005). We acknowledge there can be significant disconnects between 
discourse and practice. However, assessments of the extent to which such policies are 
actually implemented effectively are largely outside the scope of this paper.   
China is a particularly good subject for studying state discourse because of the prominence of 
political ideology—understood in the Chinese context as a body of ideas linked to ‘power, 
language and social practices and institutions … driven by the need for all political forces to 
legitimise their strategies and programmes, by creating an appropriate intellectual narrative’ 
(Brown, 2012; see also Eagleton, 2007). In the period under Xi, Communist Party of China 
(CPC) ideology has been reinvigorated and largely defined by the Party’s struggle against 
Western liberalism (Callahan, 2015; Garnaut, 2019; Gries, 2020). As Brown and Bērziņa-
Čerenkova (2018) argue, in the Xi era, ideology ‘enforces unity, creates a common purpose, 
and operates as a means of guiding the country, under the direction of unified CPC rule, 
towards its great objective—modernisation with Chinese characteristics’ (339).  
This paper was generated together with a companion paper examining the emergence of the 
blue economy in Philippines (Satizábal et al., 2020). Both papers generated a library of 
categories for both countries regarding: what is being discussed; where it is being discussed 
and where it will be applied; who participates and benefits; what/who is missing from the 
discussion; and what the implications are. Specifically, we categorised the documents in 
terms of theme (coastal-marine governance, sovereignty, industrial development, sustainable 
development, demographics-population), and in terms of scale (multilateral, bilateral, 
international, and national), and used NVivo software to code sub-themes. For example, 
under the national node, some sub-themes included policies and institutional frameworks, 




resource management. Based on the relative dominance of particular codes for the China 
analysis we developed the three key themes of economic, geopolitical and ecological 
modernisation (Babbie 2011; Bernard, 2017). Most of the documents were coded under the 
national scale. While Chinese-language documents focused on linked economic and 
geopolitical themes, with some ecological concerns, English-language documents from 
Chinese sources were almost exclusively focused on international policy and geopolitical 
studies.  
A note on language is necessary here. In addition to the diverse ways in which the English 
term ‘blue economy’ is interpreted and used internationally (Silver et al., 2015; Voyer et al., 
2018), there are several related terms in use in China. In the vast majority of the Chinese 
literature reviewed, and in almost all official policy documents and yearbooks, the term 
‘ocean economy’ (海洋经济) is used, and with gradually increasing consideration in five-
year plans until the 13th Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development, when the 
term ‘blue economy’ (蓝色经济) was used in a five-year plan for the first time (Erickson & 
Martinson, 2019). In several academic journal articles and academic theses the term 
‘maritime economy’ (海上经济) is used, always with reference to China’s relationship with 
foreign entities (Liu, 2015; Liu, 2017; Li et al., 2018). The term ‘blue economy’ (蓝色经济) 
is usually used in the context of environmental sustainability and the related ‘green 
economy’, and has only recently been used in official discourse (e.g. NDRC and SOA, 2019; 
Li, 2019). The term ‘blue territory’ (蓝色国土) is also sometimes used, referring to 
unexploited maritime areas with much potential for economic value generation, and also to 
areas of ocean that China claims jurisdiction over (Martinson 2018). 
When referring to specific Chinese sources we use direct translations (ocean, maritime, blue), 




economy’ and wider global discussions of the ‘blue economy’—discussions surrounding both 
concepts are attempts to articulate conceptions of how to use, manage and control the ocean.  
 
RESULTS 
The following sections show how discourse about the blue economy works with reference to 
state visions of economic, geopolitical and ecological modernisation.  
Economic Modernisation 
This section introduces how the ocean economy is represented in official Chinese plans, 
policies and statistics, and then presents two of the central strategies for China’s economic 
modernisation: industrial upgrading, and functional zoning based on geographic location 
theory.   
While economists in China have been discussing developing the ocean economy since at least 
1978 as part of the wider ‘reform and opening up’ strategy led by Deng Xiaoping, the central 
authority started boosting ocean economic development as a core policy priority in the early 
2000s (NPC, 2002; State Council, 2003). By 2019, China’s ocean economy was RMB 8.94 
trillion, accounting for 9 percent of China’s overall GDP (Ministry of Natural Resources, 
2020). The Chinese government promotes the development of twelve different sectors of the 
ocean economy: seawater utilisation, electricity, mining, salt, chemical engineering, 
pharmaceuticals, shipbuilding, hydrocarbon, engineering, marine fisheries, travel and tourism 
(Fig 1). In the 13th Five-Year Plan for Ocean Development, China’s technocratic leadership 
set explicit ocean economic development targets for the ocean economy overall and with 
regard to these individual ocean sectors, including specific goals for economic strength (e.g., 
ocean GDP as a percentage of national GDP); science and technology (e.g., rate of 




industries in the service sector); society and livelihood (e.g., science and education bases); 
and natural environment (e.g., water quality).  
 
Figure 1: Contribution of China’s Marine Industries to the Ocean Economy, 2019 
(Ministry of Natural Resources, 2020) 
The goal of industrial upgrading in China’s blue economy is to modernise the inefficient 
operation and management of the more ‘traditional’ of the twelve ocean economy sectors, 
such as low-tech fisheries, and to emphasise newer, innovative ways of attaining economic 
growth that capture added value from moving away from the primary sector (production of 
raw commodities) to the secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (services) sectors (Bao & 
Huang, 2012; Mao, 2013; Song, 2007). The National Science and Technology Xinghai Plan 
2016–2020 (全国科技兴海规划) emphasises how the blue economy can play a leading role 
in improving efficiency and innovation. Since the early 2000s, the growth of China’s ocean 
economy has been dominated by expansion of the tertiary sector. In particular, coastal and 




growth area: between 2002 and 2017 it grew tenfold, from 148 billion RMB to 1464 billion 
RMB (To and Lee, 2018). In contrast, marine fisheries and aquaculture grew from 121 billion 
RMB to 468 billion RMB in the same period (To and Lee, 2018). However, upgrading 
aquaculture is a major component of economic modernisation in the ocean economy. 
Attention to improving the performance of aquaculture has included emphasis on improved 
equipment, technology transfer, genetics/breeding and promoting better farming practices on 
culture density, feeding and disease prevention, and drug use (Wang, 2010; Han et al., 2016).  
Economic modernisation is also promoted by leveraging geographic advantages. In China, 
the concept of ‘geographic locational theory’ (地理区位) has been employed as the 
foundation underlying the geographic characteristics of economic development (Lou, Gu, & 
Zhong, 2005; Li, 2011; Li, Zheng, & Dai, 2018). This concept refers to the ways in which 
specific geographical localities are divided, combined or linked according to the needs of 
industrial development and strategic policy planning. As with the goals of industrial 
upgrading, the role of the state in planning and directing this process is again a crucial 
feature. The idea is to use the interconnectivity among various administrative regions—and 
between China and other countries—in order to optimise economic modernisation via several 
forms including transportation, logistics, technology, telecommunications, and tourism, and 
to reduce the gaps between more developed areas (e.g., frequently urban) with lesser 
developed areas (frequently a fishing or aquaculture region with relatively fewer commercial 
activities) (Gu, 2012, p. 19; Li et al., 2018, p. 149). Examples of policies using this 
framework include the special economic zones (SEZs)—designated zones with lower taxes 
and tariffs in order to create a foreign investment-friendly environment for an export-oriented 






Figure 2: Maritime China 
China has three regional ocean economic areas with the north around the Bohai, along the 
east coast around the Yangtze River delta, and in the south around the Pearl River delta. 
According to Jiang (2015), particular areas are associated with specific sectors, and different 
strengths and weaknesses. The northern provinces of Shandong and Liaoning are associated 
with trade, ports, tourism, and mariculture. The central provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang are 
associated with transitions from domestic capture fisheries to distant water fishing or value-
added aquaculture, while the southern province of Guangdong is associated with a high level 
of transport and logistics connectivity based around its established manufacturing industries. 




economic pilot zones (蓝色经济试验区), with Fujian’s experimenting with ocean economic 
development across the Taiwan Strait (Chinese Central Government, 2012). At the municipal 
level, 14 ocean economic development demonstration zones (海洋经济发展示范区) focus 
on particular ocean economic sectors (Chinese Central Government, 2018). 
There are many overlapping ways in which China’s oceans are zoned—including with 
reference to ocean, SEZ, province or sector. However, marine functional zoning (海洋功能
区划, a version of marine spatial planning) is employed as the main tool by which this 
geographic locational planning is implemented in the Chinese exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) (Feng et al., 2016; Choi, 2017). Coastal regions are seen to have advantages of 
accessibility and convenience of transport (Wang 2013), and oceans are associated with open 
spaces with great potential and prospects (Chen, 2010). Overall, from a geographical 
perspective, the blue economy is seen as an opportunity to promote poverty reduction and 
modernise regional ocean economies through functional zoning (Li, 2019). 
Geopolitical Modernisation  
This section introduces the key idea of maritime power, and then presents two central 
strategies by which China aims to attain this goal: the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and 
increased assertiveness in maritime disputes.  
China explicitly aims to attain the status of a ‘maritime power’ (海洋强国) (Li, 2019). While 
there is ambiguity to the precise definition of this term, Martinson tracks an increasing 
emphasis in official documents to the language of control, for example in then-State Oceanic 
Administration Director Liu Cigui’s definition of maritime power as a state that ‘has 
formidable comprehensive power with respect to developing the ocean, exploiting the ocean, 
protecting the ocean, and controlling the ocean’ (Liu, 2012, cited in Martinson, 2018). The 




who have made plans to create ‘strong maritime provinces or cities’ (e.g., in Shandong, ‘山东
海洋强省建设行动方案,’). These plans tend to describe aspirations to develop maritime 
industries in order to contribute to the construction of national maritime power. According to 
academic Liu Shuguang (2018), China’s ocean economy is seen as a driver of innovation that 
can advance the goal of becoming a maritime power and contribute to the Chinese Dream by: 
strengthening China’s status as a strong nation-state that is internationally respected; 
increasing collaboration between China and other nations; defending maritime boundaries to 
protect access to fishing resources; and ensuring the sustainability and security of the ocean 
environment. While defence technology development and Chinese naval aspirations are also 
clearly a feature of Chinese conceptions of ‘maritime power’ (Martinson, 2018; Erickson and 
Martinson, 2019), in the Chinese literature reviewed these are rarely explicitly discussed in 
reference to the ocean economy.  
The expansion of the Maritime Silk Road (海上丝绸之路) half of the Belt and Road 
Initiative (一带一路) is a form of soft geopolitical power. The Maritime Silk Road policy 
aims to rejuvenate China as a maritime economic power by reclaiming the glory of 15th-
century maritime activities associated with Zheng He (郑和) and strengthening the trading 
relationship with other states (Xu, 2017; Chan, 2018); a modernisation of the old Silk Road. 
While the strategic focus and geographic scope of the Maritime Silk Road have changed 
since its original introduction in 2013, overall, the Maritime Silk Road is presented in 
Chinese official sources as an opportunity for states to cooperate with China for joint 
prosperity and security. Among its aims are to enhance maritime trade between China and 
other countries, increase food and energy security, enable Chinese investments in port and 
ocean economy-related infrastructure, and to facilitate new sources of economic growth 




global dimension and is linked in Chinese discourse to a range of other outward-facing 
policies, such as the formulation of an Arctic Policy (Xinhua, 2018), and participation in 
multilateral fora, such as the negotiations over the Conservation and Sustainable Use of 
Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (Ma, 2019).  
However, in addition to the soft power of investments, aid and cooperation through the 
Maritime Silk Road, Chinese goals for the ocean economy have also hardened maritime 
disputes. Maritime conflicts between China, the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries are 
typically portrayed as threats not only to sovereign rights of China (Chen, 2012; Dong, 2015), 
but also to national goals of economic development. According to Li and Yang (2008), for 
example, the dispute in the South China Sea is a significant problem because it has meant that 
China has been unable to effectively develop the area. Discourses about disputes also tend to 
refer to broader geopolitical tensions. In the Chinese literature it is common to portray Japan 
and the United States as potential enemies, and Philippines and Vietnam as ‘barbarian’ or 
‘uncivilised’ (野蛮) neighbours who are allied with the United States and ‘unfriendly’ to 
China and Chinese tourists (Han, 2012; W. Liu, 2017; Li et al., 2018). Han (2012), for 
example, asserts that Chinese economic weakness in the oceans is due to ‘strategic 
containment’ by the United States and Japan (reinforcing the notion of the ‘century of 
humiliation’), supported by Vietnam and the Philippines, while Liu (2015) asserts that the 
heated dispute with the Philippines has led to Chinese fishers being ‘tied up and shot’. 
Chinese discourse sees Japan as a potential competitor and sometimes a ‘threat’ in terms of 
the ocean economy (Zhang et al. 2004; Liu, 2015). Li et al. (2018), for example, portray 
Japan as working together with the United States to ‘manipulate’ smaller countries in the 
region and to ‘intentionally block China’s maritime channels’. Such strategies to challenge 
the rise of China are perceived in dominant discourses as part of the barriers to China’s 





This section introduces how ecological modernisation in China has been represented in China 
through the discourse on ecological civilisation, and tracks how this concept has changed 
from the Hu to the Xi periods.  
In China, the concept of ecological modernisation was formalised through the publication of 
a report by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2007 (CAS, 2007; Zhang et al., 2007), and 
more recently, the related idea of ‘ecological civilisation’ has emerged as the official state 
goal, referred to by some as ‘environmental modernisation with Chinese characteristics’ 
(Muldavin, 2015: 1000). An analysis of discourses about ecological civilisation through the 
Hu and Xi eras shows how the concept evolved from an argument for stricter environmental 
laws to become a narrative for economic expansion and geopolitical superiority. 
Ecological civilisation (生态文明) is, according to the official news website of the CPC, a 
civilisation that ‘respects nature, adapts to nature, protects nature, and develops the concept 
of unity. It embraces ... the concept of ecological value and natural capital, the concept of 
spatial balance, and the idea that mountains, forests, lakes, and farm fields together create a 
community of life’ (Renmin Ribao, 2015). Ecological civilisation not only currently functions 
as a framework of China’s environmental laws, but also constructs a new Chinese concept of 
sustainability portraying China as a nation whose development is guided by a harmonious 
relationship with nature (Hansen et al., 2018). Because of its ‘harmonious’ image, ecological 
civilisation promotes a vision of society whose modes of production and trade, as well as 
resource extraction, is guided by sustainable principles and environmentally responsible 
citizens (Hansen et al., 2018).  
Ecological civilisation was first brought up as a concept by Pan Yue, the then Vice-Minister 




ideology in 2007, when President Hu Jintao announced the ‘commencement of ecological 
civilisation infrastructure’ in his work report to the 17th Communist Party Congress (Hu, 
2007). Ecological civilisation during Hu’s term as president meant stricter, top-down, ‘iron 
fisted’ pollution regulations, as well as the endorsement of a low-carbon economy (Goron, 
2018). It was not until 2012 that ecological civilisation became one of the most important 
objectives and ideologies of the CPC, when Hu dedicated an entire section to it in his work 
report to the 18th Communist Party Congress (Hu, 2012). In the same year, the construction 
of an ecological civilisation became one of the five core missions (五位一体) in the CPC 
constitution, along with political, cultural, economic, and social construction (Hu, 2012). 
Under Xi Jinping, ecological civilisation became less of a framework for environmental 
regulations, and more of a vehicle for the Chinese Dream (see Geopolitical Modernisation 
section). Because part of the Chinese Dream mandate is to create a ‘moderately prosperous 
society’ that is modern and innovative (Lin, 2016; Xinhua, 2016; see also Economic 
Modernisation section), a corresponding ‘beautiful China’ can be achieved through the 
construction of an ecological civilisation that promotes green growth, puts in effort to solve 
environmental problems, protects ecosystems, and transforms the current environmental 
monitoring system (Xinhua, 2017a).  
Xi also makes a more explicit connection between ecological civilisation and economic 
development. The catchphrase, ‘green water and green mountains mean gold and silver 
mountains (绿水青山就是金山银山)’, was written into Xi’s work report to the 19th 
Communist Party Congress (Xi, as quoted in Zhang, 2017), and suggests that environmental 
governance under Xi, while still focusing on solutions to environmental problems through 




of how it can improve economic development and modernisation, so that China can reap 
mountains of gold and silver. 
China under Xi has continued the country’s focus on the ocean as a resource. China’s 13th 
Five-Year Plan contains a chapter that cites numerous policies to develop its maritime 
economy (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2016, 116–119), 
strengthening its protection of marine resources and the environment, and safeguarding its 
maritime interests and rights. With this in mind, the 13th Five-Year Plan has stated that 
coastal development is to be carried out in a way that addresses environmental problems that 
have plagued China’s ‘blue territory’ and ‘strengthens integrated maritime management’ 
(Chinese State Council, 2015). While China has made some progress in increasing marine 
protected areas through its marine ecological civilisation policy (China Ocean News, 2018), 
by viewing the ocean as a resource and ‘blue territory,’ China is suggesting that even within 




A vibrant economy and the continual improvement of living standards is a key source of 
legitimacy for the CPC, and the oceans are seen as an increasingly important potential source 
of future economic growth. China’s strategy of industrial upgrading within the ocean 
economy has been one broadly adopted by many developing states in the post-war period to 
facilitate economic growth, hinging initially on the transition from an economy based on 
agriculture to one based on heavy industry and manufacturing, and then finally to an 
emerging economy based on services and advanced, modernised technology (Lin and Wang, 
2008; Studwell, 2013). Chinese economic restructuring is currently centred around 
restructuring the economy away from a reliance on manufacturing and exports, and adjusting 




consumption (Song et al., 2016). Similarly, China’s emphasis on functional zoning can be 
understood as a local version of what in economic geography has been written about 
clustering, special economic zones and production networks (e.g. Delgado et al., 2015; Coe 
and Yeung, 2019), and in the maritime sector specifically, marine spatial planning (Fang et 
al. 2011)—what Choi terms as the production of ‘new spatial rationalities’ (Choi 2017).  
An important theme in its blue economy efforts is China’s vision to become a strong nation, 
and how China aims to improve its status and power in the international sphere as a project of 
geopolitical modernisation. Crucially, geopolitical modernisation is intimately linked to—and 
underwritten by—the project of economic modernisation and (to a lesser extent) ecological 
modernisation. In Chinese discourse, therefore, Chinese soft power through the Maritime Silk 
Road and wider participation in multilateral oceans issues and fora, as well as Chinese hard 
power manifested in maritime disputes, are both fundamentally intertwined with the 
exploitation of and control over access to ocean economic resources. In this way, they form 
part of national development strategies to attain socialist modernisation and the Chinese 
Dream.  
The concept of ecological civilisation also serves as a means for China to contrast itself 
against ‘Western’ ways of modernisation, illustrating an alternative development path, and 
positions China’s modernisation process as morally superior due to traditional connections 
with nature (Pan, 2003). However, China’s blue economy faces significant environmental 
challenges (e.g. Hughes, Huang and Young, 2013; Cao et al., 2016). Initiatives where 
economic growth and ecological conservation take place remain separate and uneven. Hyper-
urbanisation continues unabated in coastal super-regions and environmental regulations are 
implemented but not well enforced (Sze, 2015; Xinhua, 2017b). The discourse around 
ecological civilisation never moves too far from economic growth and securing China’s 




sustainability and economic growth, the economy still takes priority and is always entwined 
with the vision of a strong state and party. Furthermore, China’s top-down approach to 
environmental protection consolidates the power of the party-state, which ‘profits from the 
environmental crisis by projecting itself as the sole legitimate steward of the environment’ 
(Li and Shapiro, 2020). 
Scholars are already debating whether China’s ecological civilisation framework is a better 
sustainable development model than those in messy Western democracies (e.g. Frazier et al., 
2019; Li and Shapiro, 2020). Ecological civilisation potentially serves as a more efficient, 
authoritarian sustainable development model or ideal being implemented in China and 
promoted abroad. This could present challenges for other countries, such as small island 
developing states , harbouring more conservation-minded views of the blue economy and 
more participatory forms of governance and accountability. 
In relation to the four central interpretations of the blue economy identified by Voyer et al. 
(2018), what is notable about China’s ideas of the blue economy is the extent to which it is 
seen as an instrument for state goals and priorities. While value-added production, business 
opportunities, improved livelihoods and ecological sustainability do figure in discussions of 
China’s blue economy, ultimately these features are couched in terms of national benefits, 
such as the contribution towards modernisation and increasing China’s position in global 
geopolitics. Social equity is assumed to follow on from economic benefits, but is rarely if 
ever mentioned explicitly. Economic, geopolitical, and, to a far lesser extent, ecological 
modernisations mutually reinforce each other to advance the goals of the Chinese state for 
socialist modernisation. This is a broader vision than the cross-cutting theme of ‘maritime 
security’ also identified by Voyer et al. (2018), and we suggest that assessing the extent to 
which states see the blue economy as an arena for performing state power would usefully 







Understanding the ways in which the concept of the blue economy moves from a burgeoning 
policy ‘buzzword’ to interact with existing programs and priorities in diverse national 
contexts is an emergent research frontier (Childs and Hicks, 2019). This paper has shown 
how China’s visions of the blue economy are focused largely around how the blue economy 
can contribute to wider state-making goals. Economic, geopolitical and ecological aspects of 
the blue economy overlap and form part of the overall state agenda to modernise the nation 
and consolidate state power. In the ideology of the CPC, this process of modernisation is part 
of the Chinese Dream—rejuvenating the Chinese nation to its historical role as a great power, 
under the leadership of the CPC. In this respect, Chinese blue economy aspirations can be 
seen through the much wider prism of other historical attempts by states to use the oceans as 
a means to increase geopolitical power (Wirth 2016). Social equity is rarely explicitly 
articulated, and ecological sustainability is a lower priority than economic and geopolitical 
aspects. The role of the state in this vision is in contrast with conceptions of the blue 
economy articulated outside China and in multilateral fora such as the FAO and World Bank, 
which emphasise to varying degrees aspects of natural capital, private investment, innovation, 
good business and livelihoods (Silver et al., 2015; Voyer et al., 2018). While the state has 
been acknowledged as a key stakeholder in other discussions of the emerging blue economy 
(e.g. Choi 2017, Carver 2019), it is rarely the central object of analysis.  
Chinese ideas about the blue economy are significant in part because of the scale and 
importance of China, and of China’s EEZ (e.g. Sumaila, 2019). However, the significance of 
these ideas go well beyond domestic Chinese priorities. China’s global influence in the 
oceans, already significant, is continuing to increase and reach into other territorial 




expanded ocean economy and territory. More broadly, Chinese aid, trade and investment is 
reshaping relationships in contested ways from Africa to the Asia-Pacific (Economy and 
Levi, 2014, Rabena, 2018, Rajah et al., 2019), including in ocean economies (Duchâtel and 
Duplaix, 2018; Fabinyi, 2020).  
As Callahan notes, the grand strategy of Chinese foreign policy ‘is ambitious: to use 
economic leverage to build a Sino-centric ‘community of shared destiny’ in Asia, which in 
turn will make China a normative power that sets the rules of the game for global 
governance’ (Callahan 2016a:3; see also Callahan 2016b; Naughton 2020). Founded on the 
narratives of humiliation and rejuvenation, China’s blue economy is cast in opposition to the 
dominant order (Wirth 2020). While there are significant caveats about the extent to which 
China can actually implement and achieve its geopolitical objectives (Zhao 2020), it is certain 
that China’s ideas about the blue economy will have increasing influence. This may be seen, 
for example, in direct exploitation of ocean spaces to which China has new access (Fabinyi, 
2020), or through investments in port, fisheries, energy and other ocean economy 
infrastructure not just domestically but around the world (Duchâtel and Duplaix, 2018). The 
desire for geopolitical expansion through economic leverage explains the emphasis in 
Chinese discourse on national benefits through economic and geopolitical modernisation. It is 
therefore unlikely that critical concerns related to ecological sustainability and social equity 
will be prioritised in, or significantly constrain, such activities. 
A Chinese blue economy is one that—through an inter-related set of economic, geopolitical 
and (to a far lesser degree) ecological practices—contributes to the broader, long-term vision 
of modernisation as a nationalist project. This vision is ultimately defined in opposition to 
Western liberalism (Callahan, 2015), and under the Xi administration, the focus on Chinese 




increasingly need to examine and adapt to the various interactions this distinctive vision of 
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